Introduction
Many problems can be resolved by using routine approaches, analytic procedures, or typical or common solutions that easily come to mind. However, other problems require more creative approaches to solution, especially when initial approaches prove unsuccessful. One aspect of human intelligence that is often important for creative problem solving is the ability to make connections between seemingly unrelated ideas and to find analogical solutions. The distance that these analogical connections span can range widely, from very close analogies that are drawn within a single domain, to very distant or remote analogies that come from disparate domains. In vivo studies of designers and scientists have shown that it is quite common for analogies to be drawn between closely related domains (Chan, Dow & Schunn, 2015; Dunbar, 2001) . Although these analogies involve a pairing of similar concepts, such local analogies can be very useful for generating solutions. Less common are analogical solutions arising from a comparison among cross-domain situations that are connected only by a deep, systematic structure.
One illustration of a remote analogical connection that enabled a solution comes from a repair made to the Hubble space telescope's mirror system (Smith & Linsey, 2011) . After the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) learned that the images produced by Hubble were blurry, they discovered that the curvature of the telescope's primary mirror was slightly off. Optical corrections were needed, but the problem was how to implement them. A number of possible solutions were considered, but none of them seemed feasible. One possibility was to place corrective mirrors inside the telescope to compensate for the defect, but a major issue was actually installing the mirrors near the difficult-to-access cameras while in space.
One of the optical engineers working on the problem found inspiration from an unexpected source: an adjustable showerhead. While taking a shower, he noticed that the showerhead could be slid up and down along a rod, and folded inward and outward. That gave him the idea to attach the corrective mirrors to robotic arms that could be extended into the telescope and retracted outward into precise locations, in a manner similar to the operation of the showerhead (Zimmerman, 2008) . This solution can be seen as an example of a successful analogical connection in which the solver was able to grasp how a set of relations present in a remote analog could be used to reach a solution to a target problem. It required the engineer to notice the relevance of a seemingly dissimilar situation to an analogous problem.
One can also consider the analogy-based solution to the Hubble mirror problem as having involved insight. The processes involved in remote analogical transfer have commonalities with those involved in insight problem solving. Both typically involve challenging problems in which a drastic shift in perspective can be beneficial, especially after being "stuck." In the case of Hubble, several months were spent hashing out solution ideas that were not useful. An impasse was reached when the engineers struggled with figuring out how to install corrective mirrors inside the telescope while it was still in space (Zimmerman, 2008) . The optical engineer who devised the clever solution was able to restructure the problem: From a very subtle cue (the showerhead), he was able to break away from more obvious, but unfeasible, repairs (for example having an astronaut climb in to make the installations, or bringing the telescope back down to Earth) and shift to a new way of thinking about the repair -packaging the mirrors into an extendable device. In this sense, the Hubble repair can be seen as both an analogical solution and an insightful solution.
As seen in the two ways of viewing the Hubble mirror problem, it is a recurring point of emphasis that the structure underlying a problem is key for its solution. Within modern research traditions, the areas of analogical and insightful problem solving share focus on problem structure. Both of these traditions have their origins in work of Gestalt pyschologists -most prominently, Karl Duncker. For Duncker, seeing the underlying structure of a problem was the essence of solution, and he pointed out that, for many vexing problems, the impediment to solution was the inability to achieve an appropriate representation, while failure was the consequence of remaining stuck in an initial representation. In his writings (Duncker, 1926; 1945) , one can see the origins of modern research on both analogical transfer, which has been concerned with the contexts and conditions under which people make structural connections to analogous cases during problem solving, and research on insightful problem solving, which has been concerned with the contexts and conditions under which people reach solutions via restructuring of an initial representation of a problem. Of these two literatures, the work on analogical problem solving has been much more focused and systematic in its explorations, relying heavily on a single paradigm inspired by Duncker and pioneered by Gick and Holyoak (1980; 1983) . The goal for this chapter is to provide an overview of several main conclusions that emerge from an analysis of the existing studies that have used this approach and to reflect on the implications of these findings for the study of insight problem solving.
The Duncker/Gick and Holyoak paradigm
As a complement to work that has attempted to identify examples of analogical thinking in the real world (whether using historical or in vivo case studies), other problem-solving researchers have aimed to investigate the conditions that influence analogical transfer in controlled settings using variants of the Duncker/Gick and Holyoak paradigm. In his original studies, Duncker (1926; 1945) presented his subjects with a variety of "practical problems" to be solved, including the now classic "tumor" (or "radiation") problem: Given a human being with an inoperable stomach tumor and rays that destroy organic tissue at sufficient intensity, by what procedure can one free the patient of the tumor and, at the same time, avoid destroying the healthy tissue that surrounds it (Duncker, 1945, p. 1) ? According to Duncker (1945, p. 3), the "best" solution is to cross several weak bundles of rays at the tumor, so that the intensity necessary for destruction is attained only there. In other words, directing multiple low-intensity rays simultaneously from different directions to converge on the tumor would spare the healthy tissue, while destroying the tumor. It was this "convergence" solution that Duncker was most interested in, yet it was offered by only 2 of his 42 subjects (Duncker, 1945) . Further, even when solvers had been exposed to a problem that had a similar solution before attempting the tumor problem (the "city" problem, in which police need a way of preventing a mob of people from creating a traffic jam on Main Street), he reported that they did not "make the slightest use of the earlier solution" (Duncker, 1926, p. 686) ; instead, they remained stuck in the concrete details of a particular story, unable to spontaneously make the connections on their own, even though they responded with an "Aha!" when directed to the earlier story.
Inspired by Duncker's work, Gick and Holyoak (1980; 1983) developed a paradigm to test for the conditions under which people may reach uncommon, but effective, solutions, such as the convergence solution to the tumor problem. However, rather than relying on a participant's own prior experience (which would determine access to a structural analog in memory), they pre-exposed their participants to analogous source stories before having participants attempt to solve the target problem. Importantly, although these source stories varied in the extent to which they seemed similar to the problem, the critical feature was that they included the convergence solution that could be used to solve the target problem.
For example, consider the source story "The General" (Gick & Holyoak, 1980; 1983) and its relationship to Duncker's (1945) tumor problem. The main character in "The General" plans to lead his army to capture a fortress. There are many roads converging on the fortress that have been mined by the enemy, preventing the general from sending his entire army down a single road. The weight of such a large force would detonate the mines, harming the army and nearby villages. The general's solution is to divide his army into smaller groups and send them down the multiple roads simultaneously toward the fortress, so that the forces converge to capture the fortress without detonating the mines. In the analogous tumor problem, a doctor must treat a patient with an inoperable stomach tumor. Rays can be used to destroy the tumor if the intensity is high enough, but this would result in destroying healthy tissue as well. The solution is to direct multiple low-intensity rays at the tumor simultaneously from different directions, destroying the tumor, while sparing the healthy tissue. These two stories and their solutions are structurally consistent with each other due to the shared convergence principle that relates the story elements to one another. However, these stories differ considerably in their surface features (for example rays vs. armies, tumor vs. fortress). Moreover, the specifics of these surface features have no bearing on the solution principle (for example the fact that the tumor is in the stomach and the fact that the fortress contains a dictator).
While the correspondences between these stories may appear obvious, when participants are asked to read "The General" story immediately before being given the tumor problem, it is quite uncommon for participants to apply the solution that appears as part of the former as a solution to the latter. For instance, in the second of Gick and Holyoak's (1983) experiments, in which participants initially studied "The General" in one phase, followed by a second phase in which they attempted to solve the tumor problem, observed solution rates for the tumor problem were only around 30 percent. Decades of research using variations on this paradigm have demonstrated that spontaneous transfer from a source story to a target problem is generally infrequent. This research has also demonstrated that superficial similarity tends to guide the search of memory during solution (Gentner, Ratterman & Forbus, 1993) . Although many studies have demonstrated that people can retrieve and apply the remote analog when prompted, without such prompting solutions are rare.
Rates of transfer with and without hints
A summary of the studies that have explored hinted and nonhinted transfer, using similar paradigms involving processing a single analogous source story followed by an attempt to solve a target problem, is shown in Table 7 .1. Across all studies, the average rate of spontaneous transfer is 22 percent. It is only after being provided an explicit hint by the experimenter to think back to the source story that a majority of people successfully apply the convergence solution from the source story to the target, with an average solution rate across studies of 65 percent. One prevailing interpretation from prior work on the benefit of hinting is that it allows the solver to activate source information in memory (Spencer & Weisberg, 1986) . However, a series of studies by Anolli et al. (2001) suggests that activation of source information upon encountering the target problem does not always necessarily help. In these studies, the researchers manipulated reminding by having participants recall the solution from the source problem just prior to attempting the target. Reminding did not increase rates of solution (range 0-20 percent), while hinting did (range 50-70 percent). Their results suggest that transfer requires more than simply getting the source information active in memory; rather, something has to happen to make solvers notice a potentially relevant Gick & Holyoak (1980, E1) General Tumor 1.00 .00 Gick & Holyoak (1980, E2) General Tumor .76 .08 Gick & Holyoak (1980, E4)* General Tumor .20 .92 (continued) connection, or perhaps select the solution procedure suggested by the source from among other potential solution procedures. While demonstrating that hinting and prompting can increase solution rates is an important basic finding, when people are given an explicit hint to use the solution suggested by a prior story it actually makes it impossible to study the spontaneous solution process. Therefore, in terms of understanding what enables people to make mental leaps and connect remote analogs on their own, the more interesting conditions for research on creative problem solving are those that do not involve explicit hints of which solutions to consider. Looking at only the studies in Table 7 .1 that have explored spontaneous transfer from a single analogous source, one can see that some studies led to more spontaneous transfer than others. This may be in part due to variations in the materials that were used. In addition to the original tumor problem, a lightbulb problem has also been used as a target problem (Holyoak & Koh, 1987 Note: Lake = "Artificial Lake," Command = "The Commander," Red = "Red Adair," Fire = "The Fire Chief," Power = "The Nuclear Power Station"; G/C/R/F = General/Command/Red/Fire;/ = participants viewed only one of the stories listed.
* Source analog was accompanied by unrelated filler stories. a specialized lightbulb that overheats, resulting in the wires inside the filament fusing together. The bulb is completely sealed, and the only way of fixing the filament inside is to use an ultrasound machine that will jar apart the wires. However, the powerful ultrasound waves will also break the bulb. The solution is to direct multiple low-intensity ultrasound waves at the bulb, such that they simultaneously converge on the filament and jar apart the wires, while sparing the bulb. As shown in Table 7 .1, the average rate of spontaneous transfer from a source story to the lightbulb problem is 10 percent, while the average rate for the tumor problem is 25 percent. Similarly, the transfer rate may also vary due to the analogous source story that is provided. Several different versions of analog stories have been used. "The Commander" describes the capture of a headquarters at the center of a lake by deploying a small number of tanks across several converging bridges (Gick & Holyoak, 1983) . "Red Adair" describes an oil-well fire being put out with multiple converging streams of foam (Gick & Holyoak, 1983) . Similarly, "The Fire Chief" involves putting out a shed fire with simultaneously released small buckets of water (Gick & Holyoak, 1983) . "The Surgeon" involves the destruction of a brain tumor using multiple low-intensity rays (Keane, 1987) . "The Epidemic" describes a large amount of pesticide being delivered to a mosquito-nesting site at the center of a lake by sending multiple workers across converging bridges (Gick & Paterson, 1992) . "Artificial Lake" describes an engineer who feeds a man-made lake from multiple converging sources to avoid a destructive flooding effect that might result from a single large stream (Antonietti & Gioletta, 1995) . In "The Nuclear Power Station," the cooling center of a nuclear reactor must be fed by multiple small water pipes rather than a single large pipe (Bearman et al., 2011) .
Modified versions of several of the stories have been constructed as part of attempts to increase the surface overlap with the tumor problem. For example, a new version of "The General" ("General-Ray," or "General-Laser") was developed describing the destruction of a ballistic missile using multiple lowintensity rays or laser beams (Keane, 1987) , while Holyoak and Koh (1987) created several versions of "The Lightbulb" that simultaneously varied whether the operators were referred to as lasers or waves and whether the central obstacle was referred to as fusing or breaking apart a filament. Additionally, there are alternate versions of several stories that have been modified to describe nonconvergence solutions. "The Attack" is similar to "The General," and "The Mosquitos" is similar to "The Epidemic," only the solutions in the new versions involve temporal summation of forces. Similarly, new versions of "The General" and "The Lightbulb" have been created describing solutions that involve finding an alternate "open passage" (OP) route to the target (for example General-OP, Lightbulb-OP: Francis & Wickens, 1996; Gick & Holyoak, 1980) . The research described in the next section suggests that different source stories, which may be more or less similar to the target story, can influence the rate of spontaneous transfer.
The role of similarity between source and target problems
What explains the persistent lack of ability to make spontaneous analogical connections? The results of studies using the Gick and Holyoak paradigm suggest that failure to transfer stems from a failure of retrieval or noticing, because encounters with a target problem do not readily bring to mind the previously encountered source story. These failures occur because retrieval typically proceeds at the surface level. The prior knowledge that is activated by the target problem tends to have high surface overlap or superficial similarity with the objects or the story context that is instantiated in the target problem. For instance, people attempting to solve the tumor problem might be reminded of medical procedures. Of course, this kind of surface-level reminding is often useful: When we experience a problem, it is generally worthwhile to consider related problems that we have solved in the past, or similar cases involving local or regional analogies. However, sometimes, there are no useful surface-similar situations available to help us to solve a novel problem, requiring a search for more distant, but analogically relevant, situations. This bias in sensitivity toward surface-level information in retrieval comes at a cost to the noticing of structural information (for example the abstract principle of simultaneously applying weak, converging forces such that their combined force achieves a desired effect while sparing any harm). It seems that these abstract principles are not readily brought to mind unless a source and target problem also share surfacelevel properties (that is, similarity of objects, settings, and low-level relations). For instance, as shown in Table 7 .2, if, instead of "The General," participants encounter a story about a surgeon who treats a brain tumor using converging rays ("The Surgeon"), transfer rates to the tumor problem greatly improve (Keane, 1987, exp. 1) due to the high amount of surface overlap between the two situations. Additionally, Keane (1987, exp. 2) created two modified versions of "The General" ("General-Ray," "General-Laser") in which the given solution involved rays or lasers (which have high surface overlap with the tumor problem). These versions also led to an increase in spontaneous transfer.
Instead of providing readers with only a single source story, Francis and Wickens (1996; Francis, 1999) had people read two stories ("The Lightbulb" and "The General"), but for each person one of the stories suggested the convergence solution, while the other suggested the OP solution. They found that whichever solution was suggested by "The Lightbulb" was that which was transferred to the tumor problem. This result suggests that "The Lightbulb" shares more surface properties with the target tumor problem than "The General," and is consistent with higher solution rates of the convergence solution from versions of "The Lightbulb" than versions of "The General" to the tumor problem in Table 7 .1.
In another study that explored the effects of similarity, Holyoak and Koh (1987) carried out a factorial manipulation of both surface similarity (whether the operators were referred to as waves or lasers) and structural similarity (whether the key obstacle was breaking apart or fusing a mass) between a source problem ("The Lightbulb") and the tumor problem. Participants' spontaneous solution rates were positively impacted by both surface and structural similarity, with the highest solution rates occurring when the source was similar to the target in both structure and surface information. However, following a hint, solution rates were no longer impacted by surface similarity; only structural similarity influenced solution rates. This indicates that people can make use of structural information once the connection between two problems is pointed out, but that initial access of a previous problem that appears dissimilar does not come readily.
Alternatively, Corkill and Fager (1995) manipulated the familiarity of both the target problem and the source story. They found that "The Fire Chief" version of the problem was easier to solve than "The Lightbulb" version, but an "unfamiliar" analog was easier to apply to solving "The Lightbulb" than a more familiar analog. These results suggest that familiarity can blind participants to seeing the structure of a problem. Familiarity might cause solvers to get too caught up in the surface level of cover story, or the solution might seem so obvious that the solver may not think about "why" it works.
Other work (outside the Gick and Holyoak paradigm) supports the predominant influence of surface similarity on problem solving. Early work by Chi, Feltovich, and Glaser (1981) demonstrated that novices in physics, compared to experts, tended to categorize physics problems according to surface features rather than based on their solution principles. Experts presumably possess more wellstructured, abstract knowledge about their domain compared to novices. Based on this earlier work, Novick (1988) found that novice math problem solvers (compared to experts) tended to incorrectly apply solution procedures from previously encountered distractor problems (as opposed to more useful analogically relevant problems) that were superficially related to the target, but not appropriate. Novick (1988) concluded that because experts are better able to represent problems in their domain at an abstract level, it is easier for them to override the tendency to focus on surface features and to select the appropriate source. In a similar vein, work by Ross (1987 Ross ( , 1989 has shown that novices tend to incorrectly rely on surface information from studied examples when solving target probability problems. Chen (1995) also found that greater similarity of objects and solution procedures led to higher transfer rates.
In general, the more apparent the "match" between a source and target problem, the more likely it is that people will make the spontaneous connection between the two. This view is consistent with the work of Clement, Mawby, and Giles (1994) , who had participants learn a series of passages in which some key verbs were presented in either a domain-specific or domain-general form (for example slurping vs. collecting). Participants were later presented with a new series of analogous passages. For each passage, participants were asked to recall which previous passages it was similar to. Recall rates were higher when the two passages shared domain-general language -presumably because this reduced the need for participants to re-represent each specific scenario to retrieve its analogous equivalent. More recent work has also documented that analogical retrieval is more likely to take place when sources and targets are superficially similar (Trench & Minervino, 2015; . The level of match is not only determined by the similarities of the source and target problems themselves, but also by other factors associated with processing. For example, as shown in Table 7 .2, Spencer and Weisberg (1986) found that a change in context between the source and target problem (change in experimenter) led to reductions in spontaneous transfer rates.
The role of abstraction in source processing
While a variety of approaches have been used, one common goal of many studies of analogical transfer has been to attempt to override the effects of surface similarity by increasing the salience of abstract, schematic solution information as part of source processing. When a more generalizable principle is extracted from the specific, concrete situation in which it occurs, this makes it easier to make structural connections, without being misled by surface-level representations. In Gick and Holyoak's (1983) series of experiments, participants wrote summaries of the source stories prior to attempting the target problem. The authors found that a person's schema quality, derived from the written description of the source solution principle, was highly predictive of transfer success. Based on these findings, several studies have attempted to direct attention to the underlying principle of a story by articulating the principle for the reader or by having the reader attempt to generate the principle underlying the solution given in a source story. As shown in Table 7 .3, the benefits from articulating a solution principle or schema seem more robust in studies that use more than one analogous source story (62 percent for two stories vs. 32 percent for one story: Gick & Holyoak, 1983) or a diagrammatic illustration of the solution principle (48 percent: Pedone, Hummel & Holyoak, 2001) . These results may suggest that abstract principle statements alone are insufficient to promote transfer; rather, they must be tied to multiple specific exemplars if subjects are to extract meaningful information from them. Also, prompting readers to generate their own solution principles from a single story does not seem effective (11 percent: Bearman et al., 2011) . One possibility is that when people generate their own principles, they often fail to generate the appropriate principle, which is ultimately counterproductive. In summary, while providing solution principles intuitively seems like an efficient way of prompting abstraction, the Note: + = subjects saw both stories listed.
results of these studies suggest that simply articulating principles is not generally a powerful enough condition to promote transfer. While these studies aimed to promote abstraction by providing principles to the participants, other work has aimed to promote abstraction of important concepts via special instructions of how to process the source stories. Mandler and Orlich (1993) gave participants abstraction training when studying "The General," which involved focusing on the relations underlying the solution rather than on the specific objects and characters. They compared this to other kinds of training instructions (for example providing a gist summary of the story or focusing on the details of the story). In their first experiment, although type of training did not affect transfer, the quality of description that participants generated did predict transfer: Participants who produced more abstract source descriptions showed higher rates of transfer. This is similar to Gick and Holyoak's (1983) finding that the extent to which written summaries of source stories include a solution schema is predictive of subsequent transfer. In Mandler and Orlich's (1993) second experiment, when participants were given experimenter feedback during training, the abstraction training did have a positive impact on solution quality, However, performance was scored using a 1-3 quality rating, so it is unclear what effect the instructional manipulation had on the rate of convergence solutions.
Several other studies have attempted to manipulate the way in which readers process the source stories by prompting them to engage in either explanation or evaluation. As shown in Table 7 .4, conditions that prompted participants to explain why the solution to a source story is effective (for example as if they were explaining it to an alien) led to average rates of transfer of 32 percent. In contrast, conditions that prompted participants to evaluate the solution suggested by a source story (as if it were not the only possible solution) produced average rates of transfer of 8 percent. Bearman and colleagues (2011) suggested that evaluation instructions induce a focus on extraneous information that produces detrimental effects on transfer. In a similar vein, Kubricht, Lu, and Holyoak (2017) found that answering comprehension questions following a source resulted in decreased transfer rates (63 percent) compared to when no questions followed (79 percent). They suggest that answering their questions may have strengthened source-specific information, which hinders the transfer of abstract information. Unlike evaluation, explanation may promote deeper processing of source information and force problem solvers to detect gaps in their understanding (Edwards et al., 2014) .
Similarly, a number of studies have explored how instructing participants to engage in the comparison of multiple analogous source stories can improve transfer. These comparison tasks take advantage of the fact that people are fairly skilled at understanding the analogical relationship between two simultaneously available situations, which may aid in solution abstraction. As shown in Table 7 .5, presenting more than one story to participants with comparison instructions does seem to lead to improvements in rates of spontaneous transfer of convergence solutions (38 percent) compared to when multiple source stories are processed separately without instructional prompts to compare (22 percent). Only one study has utilized three source story analogs (Catrambone & Holyoak, 1989) . This led to very good performance overall (M = 61 percent). Gick and Holyoak (1983, exp. 6 ) used two stories plus a diagram and also found high rates of transfer (53-61 percent).
Further, Catrambone and Holyoak (1989) also found that some comparison instructions were more effective than others. They found that more-directive comparison instructions (in which participants were given feedback on ideal answers to the comparison questions, as well as a third analogous example) were more effective than less-directive comparison instructions that did not include feedback for a third example. They found even better performance from exposure to three analogous stories when participants were asked to solve the third example (83 percent) rather than simply to read it (64 percent). This result is similar to the finding of Needham and Begg (1991) that processing a source as a problem to be solved rather than as an already-solved problem led to higher rates of transfer. Also, Gick and Paterson (1992) attempted a source comparison instruction in which people compared source stories that were similar in multiple respects, except for the solution principle (for example convergence of forces in "The General" vs. temporal summation of forces in "The Attack"). They refer to this comparison of Note: + = subjects saw both stories listed; / = subjects saw only one of the stories listed. disanalogous stories as a "near-miss" condition. However, as shown in Table 7 .5, the rate of transfer in the near-miss condition (37 percent) did not appreciably differ from other comparison conditions in that study. Even comparison to a filler story was similar to comparison among two analogs. Finally, related work within the domain of business has found a benefit from multiple-source comparison on transfer of solutions to more real-life problem scenarios, such as contract negotiation (Gentner, Loewenstein & Thompson, 2003; Gentner et al., 2009; Loewenstein, Thompson & Gentner, 1999) . Much of what these source-processing tasks (comparing, solving, explaining) may do is force more active, deeper processing of abstract solution principles, which then promotes transfer. The use of visuospatial representations has also been explored as a means of supporting abstraction. Examples ofdiagrams that have been used in studies are included in Figure 7 .1. The top example (Figure 7.1a) is the original diagram used by Gick and Holyoak (1983) , in which the left panel represents application of a full force (single large arrow), while the right panel represents the convergence solution (multiple small, converging arrows). The authors found that presenting participants with this illustration of the convergence principle prior to seeing the tumor problem increased the rate of convergence solutions. However, the benefit was greater when two source analogs were provided along with the illustration, as opposed to a single source story or no story. Other researchers have created aids that are not meant to accompany source stories, but which can be studied on their own. Beveridge and Parkins (1987) developed a "summative intensity" diagram, which was meant as an improvement to the Gick and Holyoak diagram, because it more clearly illustrated the summation of multiple forces at the central point of convergence (Figure 7 .1b). Kubricht and colleagues (2017) created a "cannonball" diagram that illustrated the destruction of a central object (without destroying a surrounding friendly barrier) by firing multiple small cannonballs ( Figure  7.1c) . Before illustrating the convergence solution, three failed solutions were illustrated (single cannon/small cannonball, single cannon/large cannonball, multiple cannons/large cannonballs). Additionally, this diagram was either static or animated. As shown in Table 7 .6, the animated version led to higher transfer rates (83 percent) than the static version (55 percent). Pedone and colleagues (2001) also used a sequence of illustrations ("convergence sequence") that demonstrated four incremental steps toward the convergence solution Gick & Holyoak (1983, exp. Note: D = diagram; + = subjects saw both stories listed; / = subjects saw only one of the stories listed.
* Second story was a near-miss. ** Second story was a filler. † Participants received more-directive comparison instructions. Sources: (a) Gick & Holyoak (1983) ; (b) Beveridge & Parkins (1987) ; (c) Kubricht et al. (2017) ; (d) Pedone et al. (2001) using converging arrows (Figure 7 .1d). When this sequence was presented in an animated form, it led to higher transfer rates (55 percent) than when it was static (15 percent). These animated illustrations represent a more dynamic illustration of the convergence principle. Other studies have further explored other dynamic source representations, such as enacting solutions using physical objects (Beveridge & Parkins, 1987; Catrambone, Craig & Nersessian, 2006) , or requiring participants to draw the solution themselves (Bassok, 1997) . As noted in Table 7 .6, the mean transfer rates from these more-dynamic representations are quite robust (67 percent). Additionally, it appears that when visuospatial aids are included with the target problem, this improves transfer (72 percent) compared to when they are included only in the source (M = 42 percent), suggesting that including the aid as a retrieval cue can increase noticing of the structural information available in the source. Effects of visuospatial aids during source processing (or as alternatives to source stories) on spontaneous transfer of convergence solutions Tumor .07 Gick & Holyoak (1983, exp. 6) (See Table 7 .5) GH83 diagram (as source)
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Tumor .61 Gick & Holyoak (1983, exp. 6) (See Table 7 These results suggest that the use of dynamic visuospatial representations may be a highly effective way of promoting abstraction by providing a lean, disembedded instantiation of the convergence principle that is free of extraneous details that may otherwise interfere with noticing analogical connections. These findings are consistent with work showing that removing concrete features from example problems, or fading concrete features within simulations, can improve transfer of principles in mathematical problem solving (Goldstone & Son, 2005; Kaminski, Sloutsky & Heckler, 2013) .
In addition, part of the reason why transfer rates were so high for Kubricht and colleagues (2017) is likely due to the particular way in which the diagrams were accompanied by a description of ineffective solution attempts (and not only effective solutions). For instance, even in their verbal-only conditions (no accompanying images), spontaneous transfer rates were 55 percent (Kubricht et al., 2017, exp . 1) and 58 percent (Kubricht et al., 2017, exp. 2) . This may have been due to the incremental description of solution attempts in the source, wherein failed attempts are described before reaching an effective solution. Additionally, research on the role of difficulty and failure (Gick & McGarry, 1992; Needham & Begg, 1991) has found that failed attempts at solution for source problems can promote transfer more than simply studying a successful attempt, and this may be due to the way in which an initial failure highlights a key solution component.
Finally, a more recent study by Monaghan and colleagues (2015) did not attempt to manipulate abstraction during source processing, but rather manipulated whether participants slept or stayed awake during a delay between exposure to a source analog and the presentation of the target problem. Prior work (Catrambone & Holyoak, 1989) has established that delays of between 30 minutes and one week between exposure to the source and target problem generally led to lower rates of transfer (10 percent) compared to when the source and target problem were presented in closer temporal proximity. However, Monaghan and colleagues (2015) found that sleeping during the delay benefited transfer (51 percent) compared to staying awake during the delay (36 percent). One possibility is that sleep caused the source information to be restructured -perhaps by allowing surface details to decay, leaving behind a more abstract representation (Wagner et al., 2004) .
What all of these studies have in common is that they can be seen as attempts to support abstraction or attention to structure during source encoding. These supports are intended to help individuals to come to a deeper understanding of the source problem, so that it may be more accessible when they encounter the target problem. These manipulations, especially those involving comparison from more than two sources or visuospatial representations, can produce substantial improvements in transfer rates. However, they depend on changes in encoding that precede the encounter with the target problem. In real-world situations, it is not reasonable or feasible to expect that we will think of every situation we encounter in terms of the deep causal structure that underlies it. For instance, comparison between multiple source analogs may be effective, but it is rare that we simultaneously engage in comparing analogous situations to set the stage for later success.
The role of structure-based processing during solution
In contrast to exploring conditions that increase structure-based processing during the encoding of source analogs, other work has explored the role of structure-based processing of the target problem. For example, Grant and Spivey (2003) found that presenting solvers with an animated diagram representing the tumor problem that directed participants' attention to the patient's skin improved the rate of solution to 67 percent (as compared to around 35 percent from static diagrams or animations that directed attention on the tumor). Similarly, Thomas and Lleras (2007) guided participants' eye movements to the convergence solution while viewing the tumor problem, under the guise of a digit-tracking task (participants were unaware that this served as a hint). They found that this manipulation improved solution rates. While these studies did not examine transfer from a source problem, a final set of studies shown in Table 7 .7 have focused on factors at the time of encountering the target problem that influence transfer of convergence solutions from previously experienced source analogs. For instance, rather than requiring participants to compare two source analogs prior to solving a single target problem, some studies have required the comparison of two unsolved target problems following a single source analog (Gentner et al., 2009; Kurtz & Loewenstein, 2007; . As shown in Table 7 .7, target comparison conditions appear to be more effective at increasing spontaneous transfer of the convergence solution (42 percent) than multiple target conditions that do not include comparison instructions (10 percent). Further, engaging in comparison among target problems seems to be as effective as engaging in comparison among multiple source stories (37 percent, as shown in Table 7 .5). The effect of target comparison on solution is not as strong when no initial source story is provided (26 percent). This suggests that engaging in target comparison helps to prompt some change in the solvers' problem representation that specifically increases the likelihood of retrieval of the analogous source story, rather than prompting the convergence solution more directly. Minervino and colleagues (2016) further explored having participants engage in comparison between the tumor problem and a disanalogous problem ("The Asteroid") and having participants invent their own analogous problem to the tumor problem. Comparing disanalogous targets did not produce appreciable increases in transfer rates (14 percent). However, the invention condition, wherein participants were instructed to create an analogous problem to the tumor problem that had dissimilar objects, but which shared the same structure, led to spontaneous transfer rates of 26 percent. While this is not an especially large percentage, this was significantly higher than a condition in which participants invented an analogous target without having first read a source story (10 percent), which suggests that the act of invention aided spontaneous retrieval of the source. Additionally, of the people who were actually successful in generating their own analogous target, 48 percent transferred the convergence solution to the tumor problem. This result is in line with the previous finding that explicitly instructing participants to try to think of cross-domain analogies improved retrieval of remote sources from memory .
These target comparison studies are important because they provide a means of promoting spontaneous transfer without requiring that a problem solver first engage in abstraction of solutions during source encoding. By comparing the tumor problem to a similar unsolved target problem, this forces the problem solver to shift to a more abstract representation of the tumor problem, which serves as a more effective retrieval cue for the source.
Conclusions and implications
What cognitive processes help us to make mental leaps and spark novel connections across remote analogs? From this analysis of the body of work inspired by Duncker (1926; 1945) and Gick and Holyoak (1980; 1983) , three main conclusions can be offered regarding the conditions that may allow people to spontaneously transfer previously encountered solutions to novel problems. The first general finding is that overt similarity in properties of agents, objects, operators, or contexts across problem situations provides the easiest route for making connections. This may include near-transfer from local or regional analogies (Chan et al., 2015;  Note: + = subjects saw both targets.
* Disanalogous target problems Dunbar, 2001 ), but the creative leap involved in making these close connections may be smaller (Green, 2016) . The second general finding is that some contexts that promote abstraction of structural information (such as explanation or comparison using more than two source analogs, and dynamic visuospatial representations) can help readers to access and retrieve appropriate solutions from memory in the absence of overt similarity. The third suggestion is that conditions that promote alternative representations of the problem during the course of a solution attempt may provide additional opportunities for solvers to notice and retrieve useful, but remote, analogs from memory. Many studies both within the Duncker/Gick and Holyoak tradition, as well as within the larger literatures on problem solving and analogical thinking, have shown that increasing the amount of similarity between source stories and target problems, or increasing the match between the contexts in which sources and targets are experienced, can improve rates of spontaneous transfer of solutions from earlier examples. Superficial matches between source and target scenarios or contexts prompt spontaneous reminding and increase the chances of noticing that a previously encountered solution can be used to resolve the current problem. In these cases, the target problem can be solved even if the initial problem representation is heavily based on surface features. Thus, because no restructuring of the problem representation is required, this type of solution by analogy would not require insight.
While the influence of similarity on search through memory has been well established, it is often the case that there are no obvious points of overlap between the problem that one is facing and the prior experiences that could be evoked in memory to provide a fruitful resolution. In these cases, making a mental leap and retrieving a more remote analog may be critical for success. If solvers start with an initial representation of the target problem that is heavily based in surface features, then this will cause solvers to start the search for solution in the wrong area of the problem space, because they will begin by exploring cases that have overlap with that initial problem representation. If people fail to abandon their initial inappropriate representation of the problem, they will remain at impasse. However, if people revise the initial representation in light of a new approach by focusing on structural information and the nature of the impasse or obstacle, this will enable noticing and retrieval of remote analogs. This type of solution by analogy provides an example of an insightful solution process because it involves initial failure when solution is attempted via usual routines or highly accessible ideas prompted by an initial problem representation, and restructuring of the initial problem representation to access more useful possibilities.
To be able to notice, retrieve, or access less similar and more distant (but more useful) analogs, a growing body of findings suggests that people need either to decontextualize the potential solutions they acquire from specific source cases via abstraction or to actively restructure their problem representations as they attempt solution. Abstraction of solution principles has long been argued to be important for enabling transfer, but this review has revealed that the results of many manipulations intended to promote abstraction have failed to provide robust effects on the rates of spontaneous transfer. There were, however, a few contexts that led to more impressive results, including prompting explanation or comparison using more than two source analogs and the presentation of dynamic visuospatial representations during encoding. Yet it is problematic that these improvements depend on changes in encoding that precede the encounter with the target problem. These manipulations seem difficult to apply in real-world situations. Comparison among multiple source analogs may be effective, but most people do not typically engage in comparing analogous situations to set the stage for later success. Thus manipulations that can alter the likelihood of transfer by altering the context of problem solving during the solution of the target problem would seem more useful for application outside of the laboratory.
From this perspective, the most promising results that were reviewed are those that prompted re-representation of the target problem. Revising the initial problem representation allows the problem to be seen in a new way and increases the chances of noticing and retrieving the remote analog. The main source of evidence in this vein comes from newer work demonstrating the benefit of engaging in comparison of two unsolved target problems. This activity could be thought to help solvers to go beyond the initial problem representation that is implied by the specific language used in each instance. Even in his initial studies, Duncker found that the specific language that is used in the problem statement can affect likelihood of reaching the convergence solution. For example, he found higher solution rates for the tumor problem when it described the radiation agent as being "particles" rather than "rays." He suggested that the term "rays" biased solvers into a problem representation in which the radiation was perceived as a discrete unit that could not be divided, whereas "particles" was a "looser" term that was more conducive to division (Duncker, 1945, pp. 24-25) . He further argued that one main impediment to solution came from being too wedded to the problem structure that is initially suggested by a particular context-specific representation.
Comparing two targets means that solvers are exposed to alternative forms of language, which may reduce these biases. Alternatively (or in addition), seeing two problems may help solvers to reformulate the obstacle or the gap that needs to be filled. Instead of destroying a tumor, the problem must really be seen as being about not destroying healthy tissue or about being able to deliver a strong force only in one place. This process can be seen as a form of restructuring (Duncker, 1926 (Duncker, , 1945 . Once solvers start thinking about the problem as "How do I use a weak force to achieve a strong effect?," that phrasing or that structure might serve as a better retrieval cue for bringing to mind the solution from the previous source than "How do I remove the tumor without harming the patient?" This can then allow for a more productive search of the solution space. Exposure to two problems may help the solver to reconsider the main obstacle in each problem, but it is critical that they engage in generating some linguistic account of the similarity or differences between the problems. This re-representation of the problems may be the key for solution. It is also possible that prompting solvers to generate drawings during solution attempts could provide solvers with another way of engaging in re-representation, and in the Bassok (1997) study this might have helped to eliminate biases that were imposed by the wording of the problem.
Another possible route to re-representation is as a consequence of earlier failures, as suggested by Kubricht and colleagues (2017) , in which study participants encountered failed solution attempts prior to viewing the successful solution. Other work outside the Duncker/Gick and Holyoak paradigm suggests that experiences of difficulty or failure during attempts to solve problems can sometimes be beneficial to transfer (Didierjean & Nogry, 2004; Gick & McGarry, 1992; Needham & Begg, 1991) . While these benefits may partially result from a greater degree of abstraction that occurs as result of difficult source processing (Didierjean & Nogry, 2004) , an additional possibility is that the experience of failure may prompt solvers to reconsider their assumptions, to question and revise their initial problem representations, and to open their mind to other possibilities. Consistent with this suggestion, subtly cuing naive participants with analogous source solutions following failed attempts at target problems has been found to increase noticing of connections (Christensen & Schunn, 2005) .
In general, what these manipulations might do is "push" restructuring of the target problem in a way that makes solvers more likely to notice the relevance of the source analog, even without creating an abstracted or schematic representation of prior solutions. Because these manipulations do not rely on altering the encoding of the source analogs in memory, they seem the most promising to pursue in future work on what might help people to abandon unviable surface representations and support noticing of remote analogical connections. Of course, there are innovative solutions that can, and have, arisen from the use of local or regional analogies (Chan et al., 2015; Dunbar, 2001) . However, in cases in which the initial problem representations are too grounded in the details of a particular situation, then revising the initial representation of the target problem provides a way of breaking through the surface and finding a distant, yet structurally relevant, solution.
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